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Abstract 
 
Countries can freely decide whether to permit or ban parallel trade. Article 6 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) – being the only provision in the various international agreements on 
intellectual property rights that deals with the treatment of parallel trade – 
preserves the territorial privilege for regulating parallel trade. In a parallel trade 
model with two heterogeneous countries in terms of market size, we address the 
question as to whether parallel trade freedom is beneficial or detrimental from a 
consumer’s perspective. In particular, the model suggests that parallel trade 
freedom is detrimental to consumers in the country with the smaller market as less 
of a certain product is sold at a higher price. However, parallel trade freedom is 
likely to be beneficial to consumers in the country with the larger market. We also 
find that the smaller country, in terms of market size, will remain unserved under 
parallel trade freedom if the second country is sufficiently attractive in terms of 
market size. 
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1  Introduction
1
  
 
Parallel trade occurs if goods that are legitimately produced under the protection 
of a copyright, trademark, or patent are placed into circulation in one country and 
then imported into a second country without the permission of the owner of the 
intellectual property rights attached to the product in the second country. For 
instance, it is permissible for a trading firm to purchase quantities of prescription 
drugs in Greece and import them into Sweden without the approval of the local 
distributor that owns the licensed patent rights.2  
 
Parallel imported products are not counterfeited or pirated but are legitimate 
products. However, they may not carry the original producer’s warranty and may 
be packaged differently. Moreover, parallel importing firms ordinarily purchase a 
product in one country at a price that is lower than the price at which the product 
is sold in the second country (arbitrage between markets). 
 
In particular, the regulation of parallel trade in the field of pharmaceuticals has 
become a critical issue in the global trading system, as the welfare effects of parallel 
imports of pharmaceuticals are generally ambiguous.3 In particular, there is 
tension between two major objectives of public policy. On the one hand, a major, 
long-term public policy objective is to stimulate the innovation and development 
of new medicines by awarding pharmaceutical producers with a patent on new 
medicines. In particular, pharmaceutical producers benefit from the higher prices 
of medicines protected by a patent, and they are, therefore, able to cover high 
R&D costs. On the other hand, public policy should also ensure broad access to 
affordable existing medicines in the short-term. Hence, there is a trade-off between 
access to affordable medicines in the short-term and higher (monopolistic) drug 
prices that stimulate R&D in the long-term. 
 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Thomas Eger, Keith E. Maskus, Eberhard Feess, Nathalie Jorzik, 
Jan Peter Sasse, and conference and seminar participants in Hamburg and Zagreb for their valuable 
comments. Any remaining errors are our own. 
2 See Maskus (2001: 1). 
3 See Müller-Langer (2009: 168). See also Maskus and Chen (2004) and Danzon and Towes (2003). 
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The research-intensive pharmaceutical sector relies heavily on patents.4 Advocates 
of strong patent rights for new pharmaceutical products support a global policy of 
banning parallel trade.5 For instance, representatives of the pharmaceutical 
industry argue that if parallel importation of pharmaceuticals were allowed, it 
would slow down the development of new pharmaceuticals. 
 
However, policy-makers in many developing countries support an open regime of 
parallel trade. They place a larger emphasis on the affordability of pharmaceuticals 
than on promoting R&D abroad. For instance, they argue that it is important to 
be able to purchase pharmaceuticals from the cheapest sources possible. Of course, 
the vast majority of new inventions in the world have been and are generated by 
the pharmaceutical companies in developed countries.6 For instance, the big, 
multinational pharmaceutical companies, in terms of world market sales, are all 
based either in Europe or in the U.S., as Table 1 shows.  
 
Table 1  Pharmaceutical Sales in 2004 
Company Pharmaceutical sales, 
in US$ billions (2004) 
Based in 
Pfizer 55.1 U.S.A. 
GlaxoSmithKline  32.8 U.K., U.S.A. 
Sanofi-Aventis 27.4 France 
Johnson&Johnson 24.7 U.S.A. 
Merck 23.9 U.S.A. 
Novartis 22.9 Switzerland 
AstraZeneca 21.7 U.K. 
Roche 17.8 Switzerland 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 15.6 U.S.A. 
Wyeth 14.3 U.S.A. 
Abbott Laboratories 14.3 U.S.A. 
Eli Lilly 12.7 U.S.A. 
Schering-Plough 6.9 U.S.A. 
Bayer 6.4 Germany 
 
Sources: IMS Health, www.pharmacy.org and Thomson Datastream. 
 
                                                 
4 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004: 1037). 
5 For instance, see Barfield and Groombridge (1998). 
6 See Sykes (2002: 47). 
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The opposition to restricting parallel trade in most developing countries reflects 
concerns that domestic prices for pharmaceuticals would actually be higher under 
price discrimination. However, as we will see in the following sections, it is 
questionable whether this is a valid argument from an economic point of view. In 
economic parlance, parallel trade of pharmaceutical products limits the scope for 
third-degree price discrimination of a monopolistic pharmaceuticals producer.7 In 
third-degree price discrimination, a monopolistic pharmaceuticals producer sells 
output to different people or to segmented markets at different prices, but 
individuals in the same segmented market or group pay the same price per unit of 
output.8 If the average income and price elasticities of demand differ across 
segmented markets, optimal prices for a monopolist are likely to be different in 
those locations. In general, the monopolist will charge relatively high prices in 
markets with low price elasticity of demand, typically in highly developed 
countries; and relatively low prices in markets with high price elasticity of demand, 
typically in developing countries. Parallel trade limits the scope for third-degree 
price discrimination in the sense that the price in a low-income country with a 
high price elasticity of demand is likely to increase as a result of parallel trade, 
whereas the price in a high-income country with a low price elasticity of demand is 
likely to fall.9 
 
In Section 2, we outline the legal framework regarding parallel trade. In particular, 
we focus on Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (henceforth, TRIPS Agreement) and on the regime of regional 
exhaustion in the EU. 
 
Section 3 gives an overview of the two main strands of the existing formal 
literature on parallel trade. The first strand of formal papers analyzes the 
determinants of parallel trade. The second strand involves the dynamic effects of 
parallel trade on the decision to invest in R&D for new products. 
 
                                                 
7 Throughout the analysis we assume that a patent on a new pharmaceutical product gives the manufacturing 
firm that holds the patent a temporary monopoly. 
8 See Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985) and Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) for 
an analysis of the effect on social welfare of third-degree price discrimination. 
9 See Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong (2005: 216). See also Sykes (2002: 63) and Scherer (1980: 316). 
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In Section 4, we first analyze the question of how the manufacturer would choose 
prices for maximizing profits if parallel trade were prohibited. Then, we provide an 
analysis of uniform pricing under the threat of parallel trade. The paper concludes 
with some ideas for further research. 
 
 
2  Legal Framework Regarding Parallel Trade  
 
The ability of an owner of intellectual property rights to exclude parallel trade 
stems from the importing country’s treatment of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights. On the one hand, under a regime of national exhaustion, 
intellectual property rights end upon first sale within a country, and right-holders 
are awarded the right to prevent parallel trade from other countries. Hence, right-
owners retain full rights for distributing their goods either themselves or through 
authorized dealers; this also includes the right to exclude imports.10 On the other 
hand, a regime of international exhaustion makes parallel trade from other 
countries legal, as rights are exhausted upon first sale anywhere. Countries 
permitting parallel trade do not provide rightful owners with full rights for 
distributing their goods themselves, effectively invalidating any right to control the 
import of goods in circulation abroad. A third option is regional or community 
exhaustion. Under a regime of regional or community exhaustion, rights are 
exhausted upon first sale within any member country of the community and 
parallel trade is allowed within the community. However, parallel trade from a 
non-member country is prohibited. 
 
In the remainder of the section, we first describe the treatment of the principle of 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights within the WTO framework focusing 
on Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. The second part gives a description of the 
treatment of parallel trade in the EU. Finally, the third part elaborates on the 
different national legal frameworks regarding parallel trade, i.e. in the United 
States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Maskus (2000a: 208). 
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2.1 Parallel Trade and the WTO  
 
In general, countries are free to determine their preferred exhaustion regime for 
each form of intellectual property rights. Put differently, countries can freely 
decide on whether to allow or ban parallel trade, as long as they are not bound by 
an international agreement. However, no international convention or multilateral 
agreement on intellectual property rights has so far mandated a particular regime 
of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.11  
 
The only provision in the various multilateral agreements of the WTO that 
explicitly addresses the treatment of parallel trade is Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. In particular, American negotiators in the Uruguay Round tried to 
incorporate a global standard of national exhaustion into the TRIPS Agreement in 
order to ban parallel trade aimed at protecting innovative industries, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as other industries, such as the music and film 
industries. However, it was impossible to reach such an agreement with regard to a 
global standard of national exhaustion, because the views on the net benefits of 
parallel trade were too divergent. For instance, some WTO members such as 
Switzerland and the U.S.A. tried to include the principle of national exhaustion in 
the Agreement, while other countries such as Australia, India, and New Zealand 
defended the principle of international exhaustion.12 Therefore, Article 6 of the 
TRIPS Agreement simply prescribes that: 
 
“For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions 
of Articles 3 and 4, nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.” 
 
Hence, it seems that the compromise reached in Article 6 is simply to exclude the 
treatment of parallel trade from the dispute settlement and to preserve the 
territorial privilege for regulating parallel trade.13 Furthermore, Paragraph 5(d) of 
                                                 
11 See Fink (2005: 173). 
12 See Gervais (2003: 11). See also Chard and Mellor (1989). 
13 See Gervais (2003: 11). See also Maskus (2001: 4) and Yusuf and Moncayo von Hase (1992). However, 
after failing to include the principle of national exhaustion in the TRIPS Agreement, the U.S. then exchanged 
commitments on limiting parallel trade with Singapore in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which 
came into force in 2004; and with Australia in the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, which came into 
force in 2005. For instance, the International Intellectual Property Alliance provides a detailed list regarding 
the current status of U.S. negotiations on Free Trade Agreements with several other countries on 
http://www.iipa.com./fta_issues.html (accessed December 8, 2008). 
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the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (hereafter “Doha 
Declaration”) affirmed this interpretation. In particular, it prescribes that: 
 
“The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own 
regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment 
provisions of Articles 3 and 4.” 14 
 
Indeed, the flexibility to allow parallel trade was crucially important for many 
developing countries, as they perceived parallel trade to be an effective antidote to 
concerns about potential price increases for pharmaceuticals, due to strengthened 
patent protection in the course of the ratification and implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement.15 Furthermore, many developing countries were in favor of 
permitting parallel trade, arguing that it would allow licensees in developing 
countries to obtain export markets for high-technology products, such as 
pharmaceuticals.16 
 
2.2 Parallel Trade in the EU 
 
The European Union applies a regime of regional exhaustion to all fields of 
intellectual property within the Community.17 Put differently, exhaustion applies 
upon first sale anywhere in the EU. In particular, the ECJ has held that the free 
circulation of goods within the common market takes precedence over the 
protection of intellectual property rights.18 For instance, in the initial case for 
patents, Merck vs. Stephar, the ECJ came to the conclusion that a holder of a patent 
who decides to market his product in two EU countries cannot prevent parallel 
                                                 
14 The full text is available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm (accessed 
December 8, 2008). See also Garrison (2006: 53). 
15 See Maskus (2001: 11) and Maskus (2000a: 209). See also Watal (2001). 
16 See Szymanski and Valletti (2005: 714). See also Abbott (1998) who supported the developing countries’ 
point of view, arguing that a restriction on parallel trade was an unjustified inhibition of free trade. 
17 Hereinafter the following references to cases are to those of the ECJ if not stated otherwise. See Case C-15/74 
Centrafarm BV and Others vs. Sterling Drug Inc., and Case C-355/96 Silhouette International 
Schmiedt GmbH & Co. KG vs. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH. See also Barnard (2004: 162) 
and Maskus (2000b: 1272). 
18 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004: 1038). 
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trade between the two countries, i.e. by bringing summary proceedings against the 
parallel-importing firm for patent infringement, despite differences in patent 
protection in those countries.19 Furthermore, the primacy of the free circulation of 
goods within the common market over patent protection has been upheld by the 
ECJ’s ruling in Merck vs. Primecrown. In particular, the ECJ held that the existence 
of differential national price regulations in pharmaceuticals in the EU does not 
justify the prevention of parallel trade – i.e. by taking action against the 
infringement of a patent – from EU countries with lower (regulated) prices to EU 
countries with higher (less regulated) prices.20 Indeed, varying national regulatory 
practices that result in differences in prices for the same pharmaceutical product 
across EU countries are a major cause for arbitrage, as parallel-importing firms are 
able to buy pharmaceutical products from wholesalers in countries with low prices 
such as Portugal, Spain or Greece and resell them in countries with high prices 
such as Germany, Sweden, or the U.K..21 Recent evidence regarding parallel trade 
of pharmaceutical products within the EU shows that parallel trade is a 
considerable business activity. For instance, the York Health Economics 
Consortium (2003) estimated that the U.K. market for parallel-traded 
pharmaceutical products represented around £1,300 million (€2,000 million) in 
2002. Furthermore, the consortium estimated that parallel-traded pharmaceuticals 
accounted for around 10 percent of the total drug bill in Denmark in 2002.22  
 
Nevertheless, exhaustion in the EU has important limitations. Most importantly, 
the ECJ concluded in EMI vs. CBS and in Silhouette vs. Hartlauer that exhaustion 
does not extend to countries outside the common market.23 Hence, the ECJ 
established a regime of regional exhaustion or “Community exhaustion” but 
                                                 
19 See Case C-187/80 Merck & Co. Inc. vs. Stephar B.V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler. See also the 
initial cases for trademarks, Case C-56/64 Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundigverkaufs-
GmbH. vs. E.E.C. Commission, and for copyrights, Case C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon 
Gesellschaft mbH. vs. Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. K.G. See also Ganslandt and Maskus 
(2004: 1038). 
20 See Joined Cases C-267-268/95 Merck & Co. Inc. and Others vs. Primecrown Limited and Others. 
See also Case C-15/74 Centrafarm BV and others vs. Sterling Drug Inc. See also Wagener, Eger and 
Fritz (2006: 230) and Danzon (1998). 
21 See Kanavos and Costa-i-Font (2005: 755). 
22 See also Valletti and Szymanski (2006: 501). 
23 See Case C-51/75 EMI Records Limited vs. CBS United Kingdom Limited. See Case C-355/96 
Silhouette International Schmiedt GmbH & Co. KG vs. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH. 
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rejected the principle of international exhaustion.24 Furthermore, the ECJ 
established in Pharmon vs. Hoechst that regional exhaustion does not extend to 
products that are marketed in a member state under a compulsory license.25  
 
Another important issue with regard to potential restrictions for parallel trade 
within the common market is the question of whether supply quotas for foreign 
wholesalers imposed by original manufacturers are illegal under Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty. Most importantly, the ECJ concluded in Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-
Importeure and Commission of the European Communities vs. Bayer that unilateral 
supply quota systems are not necessarily prohibited under Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty, as long as they do not constitute a contractual agreement prohibiting 
parallel trade.26 Put differently, unilateral restraints on sales from an original 
manufacturer to foreign wholesalers are not necessarily illegal under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty. However, any contractual agreement explicitly prohibiting parallel 
trade within the common market would be void under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
 
To sum up, on the one hand, the EU system basically allows parallel trade within 
its territory, despite differences in national intellectual property regimes and 
national price regulations, as long as the product has not been marketed in a 
member state under a compulsory license. On the other hand, parallel trade from 
outside the EU is not allowed under the EU system, so that IPR owners can invoke 
their rights and prevent competition from parallel trade. 
 
2.3 National Legal Frameworks Regarding Parallel Trade 
 
Exhaustion policies vary widely between developed and developing countries and 
even among developed countries themselves, as the following summary shows.27 
                                                 
24 See also Szymanski and Valletti (2005: 712). 
25 See Case C-19/84 Pharmon B.V. vs. Hoechst AG. See Maskus (2000b:1272). 
26 See Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure e.V. and 
Commission of the European Communities vs. Bayer AG. See also Smits (2006: 65). 
27 See Maskus (2000a: 209). See also Fink (2005: 173), Maskus and Chen (2005, Table 8.1: 193) and 
Maskus (2001: 3). 
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Let us first consider national policies with regard to parallel trade in some high-
income countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. 
 
The U.S. has a mixed policy on parallel trade. Within its territory, the country 
employs what is known as the “first-sale doctrine”, under which rights of the seller 
or manufacturer are exhausted when a good has been first placed on the national 
market outside the vertical distribution chain.28 Hence, price discrimination 
against American consumers is ruled out, as U.S. firms cannot prevent consumers 
from reselling goods anywhere within the United States. 
 
With regard to parallel trade in trademarked goods, the U.S. applies a “common-
control exception”, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.29 This rule allows 
trademark owners to block parallel trade, i.e. by using statutory provisions relating 
to the exclusion of imports, except when the foreign and U.S. trademark owners 
are in a parent-subsidiary relationship or when both the U.S. and foreign 
trademark owners are owned by the same entity. Furthermore, the trademark 
owner’s ability to block parallel trade rests on his ability to demonstrate that the 
imported product is not identical in quality to the original product and that it 
could cause consumer confusion. One may argue that these principles suggest that 
parallel imports of pharmaceutical products are permitted, as they are identical to 
the original product; however, U.S. law explicitly prohibits the re-importation of 
pharmaceutical products unless the drug is imported by the original manufacturer 
of the drug (21 U.S.C. 381 (d)).30  
 
Due to the large differences in prices for prescription drugs between the U.S. and 
Canada, parallel trade in pharmaceuticals became an important issue in the 2004 
U.S. presidential elections, as many states encouraged American consumers to buy 
from parallel-trading internet pharmacies, despite the dubious legality of parallel 
                                                 
28 See U.S. Supreme Court case Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). The “first sale 
doctrine” was later codified in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976. See also Szymanski and Valletti 
(2005: 712) and Maskus and Chen (2004: 553). 
29 See U.S. Supreme Court case K Mart Corporation vs. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1987). See also Palia and 
Keown (1991: 49), Maskus and Chen (2004: 553) and Kanavos et al. (2004: 36). 
30 See the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987. See Valletti and Szymanski (2006: 500). 
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trade in pharmaceuticals under federal law.31 For instance, Graham and Robson 
(2000) estimated that brand-name drugs are significantly cheaper in Canada than 
in the U.S. at both the wholesale and retail level.32 Indeed, parallel trade has 
become a considerable business activity, as recent IMS estimates suggest. For 
instance, compared to 2002, the value of U.S. re-importation of prescription drugs 
from Canada increased by 134 percent to US$1.100 million in 2003.33  
 
Other high-income countries such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are 
substantially more open to parallel trade than the U.S. In Japan, parallel trade in 
trademarked and patented goods is allowed with two exceptions.34 First, parallel 
trade is not allowed in the case in which the original sale of the product was 
subject to foreign price regulation. Second, parallel trade can be explicitly barred 
by contractual provisions. Another high-income country that has a far more liberal 
view on parallel trade is Australia.35 Furthermore, New Zealand applies a system of 
international exhaustion with respect to copyright.36 However, the Copyright 
Amendment Act 2003 reintroduced a partial ban on the parallel importation of 
films. 
 
As the summary of exhaustion regimes of various developing and least-developed 
countries in Table 2 shows, the exhaustion regimes and, thus, the restraints on 
parallel trade vary widely in the developing world. A large number of countries, 
such as Argentina, India, and South Africa, apply a regime of international 
                                                 
31 See Szymanski and Valletti (2005: 713). 
32 See also the 1998 U.S. House of Representatives Minority Staff International Report that compared the 
international prices of prescription drugs. In particular, the report concluded that prices for pharmaceutical 
products in Maine were 70 percent higher than in Canada and 102 percent higher than in Mexico. 
33 See http://open.imshealth.com (accessed December 8, 2008). 
34 For instance, see BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik AG. vs. K.K. Racimex Japan, K.K. Jap Auto Products 
(Japanese Supreme Court decision from July 1, 1997). 
35 For instance, see the Australian Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Bill 2002 to the Copyright 
Act 1968, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd133.htm (accessed 
December 8, 2008). 
36 See Copyright (Removal of the Prohibition on Parallel Importing) Amendment Act 1998. See also 
Copyright (Parallel Importation of Films and Onus of Proof) Amendment Act 2003, available at the New 
Zealand Ministry of Economic Development homepage, http://www.med.govt.nz/ (accessed December 8, 
2008). See also Fink (2005: 174). 
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exhaustion.37 More specifically, Argentina and South Africa have enacted laws 
permitting parallel trade in pharmaceuticals.38 However, just to name a few, 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria adopt a regime of national 
exhaustion of IPRs and, thus, allow the right-holder to prevent parallel trade.39 
 
Table 2  Summary of Exhaustion Regimes in 28 Developing and  
             Least-Developed Countries  
Country  Exhaustion regime 
Argentina International exhaustion 
Barbados National exhaustion 
Belize National exhaustion 
Bolivia International exhaustion 
Botswana National exhaustion 
Brazil National exhaustion 
Colombia International exhaustion 
Costa Rica International exhaustion 
Dominican Republic International exhaustion 
Guatemala International exhaustion 
Honduras International exhaustion 
India International exhaustion 
Madagascar National exhaustion 
Malaysia International exhaustion 
Mexico National exhaustion 
Morocco National exhaustion 
Namibia National exhaustion 
Nicaragua International exhaustion 
Nigeria National exhaustion 
Peru International exhaustion 
Philippines National exhaustion 
Republic of Korea International exhaustion 
South Africa International exhaustion 
Sri Lanka International exhaustion 
Suriname National exhaustion 
Tunisia International exhaustion 
Uruguay International exhaustion 
Venezuela International exhaustion 
 
Source: WIPO (based on notifications made by Members to the WTO), Kanavos et al. (2004), Maskus and 
Chen (2002), Thorpe (2002), and Garrison (2006). 
                                                 
37 See Kanavos et al. (2004: 39). 
38 See Section 15C of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, 1997. 
39 See the analysis of the intellectual property laws on over 70 developing and least-developed countries 
undertaken by Thorpe (2002). 
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To summarize, exhaustion regimes and, thus, the restraints on parallel trade vary 
widely between developed and developing countries and even amongst developed 
countries. Furthermore, these differences in exhaustion regimes and the 
corresponding divergent views on the net benefits of parallel trade have created a 
fierce debate in recent years. 
 
 
3  Literature on Parallel Trade and R&D 
for Pharmaceuticals   
 
Before proceeding with the model, we will give an overview of the two main 
strands of the existing formal literature on parallel trade.40 First, the vast majority 
of formal papers applying game-theoretic tools analyzes the determinants of 
parallel trade, i.e. price discrimination by monopolistic manufacturers, vertical 
price control by multinational enterprises, or national price regulations. The 
second and limited strand of literature involves the dynamic effects of parallel 
trade on the decision to invest in R&D for new products, which is certainly a 
crucially important issue for the research-intensive pharmaceutical industry. 
 
3.1 The Determinants of Parallel Trade  
 
Maskus (2000a; 2000b) provides an excellent overview of the economic theories on 
the causes of parallel trade and the main arguments in favor of banning parallel 
trade. 
 
First, in many circumstances efficient international distribution of goods and 
services requires multinational enterprises that typically build markets through 
exclusive territorial dealership rights, in order to vertically control the operations 
of their official licensees. Nevertheless, in foreign markets it may be difficult to 
enforce private contractual provisions prohibiting sales outside the authorized 
                                                 
40For an overview of less formal policy-oriented reviews on parallel trade see Szymanski and Valletti (2005: 
715). See Tarr (1985), Danzon (1998), Darbà and Rovira (1998), NERA et al. (1999), and OECD 
(2002). 
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distribution chain so that parallel trade may occur.41 In particular, Maskus and 
Chen (2004) elaborate on this idea and offer a sophisticated theory of parallel 
trade in the context of vertical price controls.42 They analyze the nature of 
contractual relationships between a domestic manufacturer and a foreign, 
independent and exclusive distributor through which the manufacturer sells his 
product abroad in order to determine the optimal level of parallel trade. In 
particular, the manufacturer offers the distributor a two-part wholesale tariff 
consisting of a wholesale price and a franchise fee. The analysis suggests that the 
possibility of parallel trade affects the manufacturer’s pricing decision when fixing 
the wholesale price it charges the foreign distributor. Furthermore, the threat of 
parallel trade may reduce vertical pricing efficiency and, thus, reduce social welfare. 
Maskus and Chen (2004) conclude that the effect of parallel trade on global 
welfare is not unambiguous. In fact, they show that global welfare is U-shaped with 
respect to the cost of engaging in parallel trade, i.e. transportation costs. First, 
suppose that parallel trade costs are very low, i.e. transportation costs tend toward 
zero. In this case, Maskus and Chen (2004) conclude that the manufacturer cannot 
deter parallel trade in equilibrium by raising the wholesale price and, thus, that a 
welfare-reducing distortion in the vertical pricing scheme is not created. Put 
differently, parallel trade has good welfare properties if trade costs are sufficiently 
low, as it reallocates goods between the two countries without creating welfare-
reducing distortions in the vertical pricing scheme. However, consider now the 
other extreme case, that parallel trade costs are so high that parallel trade is not 
feasible. In this case, the authors conclude that parallel trade is not a real threat 
and that the manufacturer sets an efficient wholesale price. If, however, trade costs 
are neither too low nor too high, the manufacturer can deter parallel trade by 
raising the wholesale price and, thus, reduce vertical pricing efficiency. Finally, the 
authors suggest that the optimal policy regarding parallel trade shall either reduce 
any existing trade barriers and, thus, trade costs as much as possible or raise trade 
costs as much as possible. The optimal policy should not leave trade costs at some 
intermediate value.43 
                                                 
41 See Maskus (2000b: 1277). See also Maskus and Chen (2002). 
42 See also Gallini and Hollis (1999) who explore the nature of the contractual relationships between 
trademark or copyright owners and authorized distributors that may employ trademark and copyright law to 
prevent parallel trade. 
43 See Maskus and Chen (2004: 561). 
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A second determinant for parallel trade is that parallel importing firms have the 
incentive to free ride on investments in marketing as well as on the before- and 
after-sales services of official licensees and authorized distributors.44 For instance, 
assume that an authorized distributor in the territorial market A invests in 
marketing and sales activities that are associated with the sale of a certain product 
in market A. Consequently, the distributor in market A will charge a markup in 
addition to the procurement cost so that he can earn a return on those 
investments. Furthermore, suppose that the marketing and sales activities 
mentioned above are substantially cheaper in the territorial market B, or that they 
are not even provided by the authorized distributor in territorial market B. In this 
case, parallel importing firms that purchase the product in market B and resell the 
product in market A free ride on the investments in marketing and sales services 
made by the official distributor in market A.45 
 
Third, in some industries such as the pharmaceutical industry, national 
governments intervene in private markets by regulating prices in order to achieve 
particular social objectives, i.e. to make medicines affordable for low-income 
consumers and to limit public health budgets. As these government interventions 
result in significant international price differences, there is a potential for arbitrage 
between markets, as parallel importing firms may purchase a certain product in 
more regulated (lower-price) markets and resell the product in less regulated 
(higher-price) markets.46 In a recent paper, Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) identify 
international differences between the regulatory regimes in the pharmaceuticals 
area as a main determinant of international price discrimination.47 In particular, 
the authors explore the welfare implications of permitting parallel trade of 
pharmaceutical products in a model in which countries may differ along two 
dimensions. First, countries may be different in terms of governmental health 
insurance reimbursement policies, as is reflected in the patient’s level of co-
payment for buying a pharmaceutical product. Second, countries may differ in 
terms of drug needs, as is reflected in the distribution of the valuations for the 
                                                 
44 See also Chard and Mellor (1989) and Barfield and Groombridge (1998). 
45 See Maskus (2000b: 1275), Maskus (2000a: 212), and Fink (2005: 176). 
46 See also Danzon (1997). 
47 See also Szymanski and Valletti (2005: 715). 
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pharmaceutical product among their population. In particular, Jelovac and Bordoy 
(2005) show that parallel trade increases total welfare when countries share the 
same health system and only differ in the distribution of the valuations for the 
pharmaceutical product among their population. In this case, parallel trade leads 
to an efficient re-allocation of consumption from consumers with a relatively low 
valuation of the pharmaceutical product in the exporting country towards 
consumers with a relatively high valuation of that product in the importing 
country. If, however, the countries only differ in terms of their health insurance 
reimbursement policies, parallel trade decreases total welfare, as it re-allocates drug 
consumption from consumers with relatively high valuation of the pharmaceutical 
product towards consumers with relatively low valuation of that drug. However, 
Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) do not consider the dynamic effects of parallel trade on 
R&D for new pharmaceutical products. 
 
In another recent paper, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) also take into account 
international differences between the regulatory regimes in the pharmaceuticals 
area. The authors focus in particular on the econometric analysis of the price 
impact of parallel trade in pharmaceutical products within the European Union. 
Interestingly, despite the importance of parallel trade from a welfare perspective, 
their analysis is the first systematic economic investigation into the price impacts 
of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals. In particular, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) 
explore the effect of the entry of parallel traders on the prices of pharmaceutical 
producers in Sweden from 1994 to 1999. Prior to Sweden’s entry into the 
European Union on January 1, 1995, parallel trade in pharmaceuticals was 
prohibited. However, after its entry Sweden had to adopt the EU-wide principle of 
exhaustion of patent distribution rights and, thus, permitted parallel trade. 
Therefore, the Swedish market provides a natural example for testing and 
estimating the effect of the exogenous shock to the patented pharmaceutical 
market, due the introduction of parallel trade. Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) find 
that the prices of pharmaceutical products subject to competition from parallel 
trade fell relative to other pharmaceutical products in the period from 1994 to 
1999. In particular, the authors conclude that parallel trade significantly reduced 
prices, by 12-19 percent, relative to other pharmaceutical products not subject to 
competition from parallel trade. Arguably, parallel trade represents a significant 
form of competition in Sweden. 
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Finally, Richardson (2002) analyzes a two-stage game in which welfare-maximizing 
national governments simultaneously choose whether to permit or prohibit 
parallel trade in the first stage. In the second stage, a monopolistic manufacturer 
of a homogenous good sets a price for that good in each country. By assumption, 
welfare in the country in which the monopolist is located is given by the sum of 
the domestic consumer surplus and the global profits of the monopolist. However, 
welfare in all other countries is simply domestic consumer surplus. The author 
shows that it is a global Nash equilibrium for all countries to permit parallel trade, 
resulting in a globally uniform price for the product. The idea behind this result is 
the following. On the one hand, the countries that prefer to permit parallel trade 
are those countries that would be discriminated against if parallel trade were 
prohibited, i.e. countries with a high-price market and with a relatively low price 
elasticity of demand. Those countries can prevent price discrimination by 
permitting parallel trade. On the other hand, those countries that might favor 
discrimination, i.e. countries with a low-price market and with a relatively high 
price elasticity of demand, cannot enforce price discrimination on a global scale 
when countries with a high-price market permit parallel trade. Finally, he examines 
more realistic settings, taking tariffs and lobbying by producers into account in 
order to analyze the question as to why barriers to parallel trade can actually be 
observed in practice. However, Richardson (2002) does not take into consideration 
the dynamic effects of parallel trade on the monopolist’s decision to invest in 
R&D for new products.  
 
3.2 Dynamic Effects of Parallel Trade on the Investment  
in R&D   
 
As previously mentioned, the question as to how much a monopolistic 
manufacturer is willing to invest in R&D for new products is clearly of crucial 
importance to the research-intensive pharmaceutical industry. However, the 
literature on this issue is rather limited. To the best of our knowledge, Valletti and 
Szymanski (2006), Szymanski and Valletti (2005), Valletti (2006), Rey (2003), and Li 
and Maskus (2006) are few exceptions who look at the dynamic aspects of parallel 
trade in the context of R&D for new medicines. 
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In particular, this issue has been addressed in a recent paper by Valletti and 
Szymanski (2006) who have extended the well-known analysis of Malueg and 
Schwartz (1994) by endogenizing the quality of the good sold. More specifically, 
Valletti and Szymanski (2006) consider a model of product innovation in which a 
higher investment in R&D enables the manufacturer to discover products with 
higher quality. In particular, Valletti and Szymanski (2006) analyze a two-stage 
game in which a manufacturer chooses the quality of the product sold in the first 
stage and then chooses prices in the second stage. Furthermore, Valletti and 
Szymanski (2006) discuss the following basic trade-off between the positive ex post 
welfare properties of parallel trade and the negative ex ante impact of parallel trade 
on aggregate welfare, respectively. In the second stage of the game, taking the level 
of product quality as fixed, a uniform pricing regime induced by parallel trade ex 
post results in higher aggregate welfare as long as demand dispersion across markets 
is sufficiently low. However, in the first stage of the game, the threat of parallel 
trade reduces ex ante the incentive to invest and, thus, results in lower product 
quality. 
 
In a recent paper, Szymanski and Valletti (2005) analyze the policy implications of 
parallel trade in a model of vertical product differentiation with endogenous 
product quality. However, Szymanski and Valletti (2005) also take into account the 
possibility that national governments may impose price caps as well as compulsory 
licences on patented products. Szymanski and Valletti (2005) conclude that parallel 
trade destroys the incentives to invest in R&D for new products if the national 
government of a foreign country issues a compulsory license on the patented 
product and unilaterally sets a fixed price equal to marginal cost to be paid to the 
patent holder. If, however, the manufacturer has the option to either supply a 
high-quality product or a low-quality product to the foreign country and the 
foreign government offers the manufacturer a binding contract to issue a 
compulsory license at a capped price only for the low-quality product, then parallel 
trade has no effect on investment incentives.48 
 
In another recent game-theoretic article, Valletti (2006) analyzes the question of 
how a uniform pricing regime induced by parallel trade ex ante affects the 
                                                 
48 See Szymanski and Valletti (2005: 735). 
 Croatian Economic Survey 2008 29 
incentives of a monopolistic manufacturer of pharmaceuticals to invest in R&D 
for new pharmaceutical products where the level of investment affects the quality 
of the new pharmaceutical product. Valletti (2006) assumes that the markets in 
which the manufacturer sells his products differ in terms of the marginal cost of 
manufacturing and delivering the product as well as in consumer demand in terms 
of the maximum willingness-to-pay of consumers. However, in his analysis of the 
incentives to invest in R&D, Valletti (2006) concludes that two trade-offs arise. On 
the one hand, when differential pricing is demand-based, uniform pricing induced 
by parallel trade has good ex post welfare properties but bad ex ante properties in 
terms of lower incentives to invest in R&D in order to obtain a better-quality 
product. On the other hand, when differential pricing is cost-based, uniform 
pricing induced by parallel trade has bad ex post welfare properties but good ex ante 
properties in terms of higher incentives to invest in R&D in order to obtain a 
better-quality product. 
 
Rey (2003) provides another formal analysis that looks at the dynamic aspects of 
parallel trade. As in most countries pharmaceutical products are not directly 
purchased by consumers but by national governments at a regulated price. Rey 
(2003) analyzes the relationship between pharmaceutical companies and national 
governments in a game where two national governments H and L contribute 
towards spurring investment through regulated prices. On the one hand, 
government H has a high willingness to pay and places strong emphasis on high 
levels of R&D for new medicines. On the other hand, government L has a low 
willingness to pay and places less emphasis on high levels of R&D for new 
medicines. In particular, the author shows that, once parallel trade is permitted, 
there is an equilibrium where government H reduces its contribution to R&D and 
sets a lower price, while government L maintains the same policy as in the absence 
of parallel trade. Put differently, in this equilibrium parallel trade leads to a 
uniform alignment on the lowest level of R&D, which adversely affects both 
countries due to reduced incentives to invest in R&D for new medicines. 
 
Finally, in a recent article Li and Maskus (2006) extend the model set out by 
Maskus and Chen (2004), as mentioned above, to a framework with endogenous 
investment in process innovation. In particular, Li and Maskus (2006) analyze the 
impact of parallel trade on cost-reducing R&D in a vertical-pricing model in which 
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a manufacturer invests in cost-reducing R&D and sells its product in another 
market through a distributor. They show that the distortions associated with 
parallel trade reduce the monopolist’s incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D.  
 
 
4  Parallel Trade and Pricing Strategies  
 
Consider a model with two countries A and B. Demand for a specific 
pharmaceutical product in country A is 
 
            (1) 
 
with 1ξ > . pA denotes the price in country A. The pharmaceutical product is 
produced by a monopolistic manufacturing firm that holds a patent on the 
medicine in both countries. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal costs of 
production c are equal to zero in both countries. This is a common assumption in 
models that deal with the strategic decisions of pharmaceutical companies, as the 
marginal cost of production are negligibly small compared to the cost of research 
and development. Demand for the pharmaceutical product in country B is  
 
B B B
D ( p ) a bp= − .            (2) 
 
   is a measure for the homogeneity of the two countries. If    tends towards 1, the 
two countries are virtually homogenous. Put differently, the higher the   , the more 
heterogeneous are the two countries in terms of market size. 
 
In the following sections we first analyze the question as to how the manufacturer 
would choose prices for maximizing profits if he directly served customers in both 
countries and parallel trade were prohibited. This section is then followed by an 
analysis of uniform pricing under the threat of parallel trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
A A A
D ( p ) a bpξ= −
 
ξ ξ
ξ
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4.1 Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Absence  
of Parallel Trade   
 
We assume that the manufacturer is given the right to prevent parallel trade and 
that he can engage in third-degree price discrimination. The manufacturing firm 
maximizes profits generated in country A according to  
 
                                                          ,         (3) 
 
which gives the following first order condition 
 
             .             (4) 
 
The profit maximizing (monopolistic) price is consequently 
 
        .         (5) 
 
Furthermore, the manufacturing firm maximizes profits generated in country B 
according to  
 
 , (6) 
 
which gives the following first order condition 
 
           .        (7) 
 
The profit maximizing price is consequently 
 
          .        (8) 
 
By looking at (5) and (8), it becomes apparent that in the case of national 
exhaustion and price discrimination, the manufacturing firm will set a price     in 
country A that exceeds the price      in country B, as the price elasticity of demand 
in country A is lower than that in country B, seeing as      . By inserting (5) into 
(1) we have 
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                   .      (9) 
 
Moreover, by inserting (8) into (2) we obtain 
 
            .           (10) 
 
Correspondingly, total profit          , defined as the sum of the profit 
generated in country A,            , and the profit generated in country B,            , is 
given by       
          
 
     .          (11) 
 
Interestingly, we can see from (11) that the total profit of the monopolist increases 
if    increases. Put differently, the higher the market size in country A for a given a 
and b, the higher is the monopolist’s total profit under a regime of national 
exhaustion and price discrimination. Comparing (5) to (8), we find that the 
difference between the profit-maximizing price in country A and the profit-
maximizing price in country B increases if countries are increasingly 
heterogeneous in terms of market size. 
 
4.2 Uniform Pricing under the Threat of Parallel Trade  
 
In this section we shall show that the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 1: The market in country B will remain unserved under parallel trade freedom 
if the attractiveness of country A in terms of market size is sufficiently high. 
 
In the presence of parallel trade, the manufacturer will charge a uniform price in 
order to prevent the occurrence of parallel trade in the first place.49  
 
In this case, the total profit of the manufacturer is given by 
                                                 
49 See also Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985). 
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                                    .      (12) 
We obtain: 
 
            
   .          (13) 
 
By inserting (13) into both (1) as well as (2), we obtain           and                    
r                    respectively.     is always positive as        . Note, however, that     is 
only positive as long as        . Intuitively, if country A is very attractive in terms of 
market size as compared to country B, i.e.     , it would be optimal for the 
manufacturer to set a uniform price that is so high that the market in country B 
remains unserved. Stated differently, if country A is sufficiently attractive in terms of 
market size, parallel trade freedom may result in the collapse of the entire market in 
country B (Proposition 1). Consequently, the legal authorities in country B may have 
an incentive to set a price ceiling in country B or to impose a fine on the 
manufacturer for refusal to supply in order to protect domestic consumers. 
 
Nevertheless, in the following we will show that                   . First, we show that     
a            as          [see (8) and (13)]. 
          
 
(14) 
                     
 
Second, we show that              as          [see (5) and (13)].      
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Furthermore, by comparing the quantities sold in country A and B under both 
uniform pricing and cross-country price discrimination, we find that the quantity 
sold in country A under uniform pricing exceeds the quantity sold under price 
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discrimination,           . We also find that the quantity sold in country B is lower 
under uniform pricing than under price discrimination,            .50 These findings 
suggest that the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 2: Uniform pricing associated with parallel trade freedom is 
(i) beneficial to consumers in country A, as more of the good is sold at a lower price; 
(ii) and is detrimental to consumers in country B, as less of the product is sold at a 
higher price. 
 
The logic behind this result is the following. The potential and credible threat of 
competition from parallel trade reduces the market power of the manufacturer in 
country A to the benefit of the local consumers. However, in order to deter the 
occurrence of parallel trade, the manufacturer strategically sets a higher price in 
country B. Furthermore, the relatively high price elasticity of demand in country B 
(as compared to country A) impairs the detrimental effect of the price increase on 
consumer surplus in country B.  
 
To sum up, parallel trade freedom – if volumes available for parallel trade are 
unlimited – induces the manufacturer to strategically set a uniform price in 
country A and B in order to deter parallel trade. The uniform price under the 
threat of parallel trade is lower than the price set in country A under price 
discrimination and higher than the price set in country B under price 
discrimination, respectively. Furthermore, uniform pricing associated with parallel 
trade freedom leads to a higher quantity sold in country A as compared to the 
outcome under cross-country price discrimination. However, less is sold in country 
B under parallel trade freedom and uniform pricing as compared to the outcome 
under price discrimination. Parallel trade freedom may even result in the collapse 
of the entire market in country B if country A is sufficiently attractive in terms of 
market size. Finally, parallel trade freedom is likely to have a negative impact on 
consumers in country B and a positive impact on consumers in country A. 
 
                                                 
50 In order to see that this is true, note that  ( ) ( )3 1 2
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5  Conclusion and Ideas for Further Research  
 
Many authors have argued that third-degree price discrimination by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers is desirable to ensure the availability of affordable 
medicines in low-income countries with relatively small markets, and, therefore, 
that parallel trade flowing from low-income countries to high-income countries 
should be prohibited.51 More specifically, consumers in low-income countries with 
a high price elasticity of demand are more likely to have access to cheaper patented 
pharmaceutical products when the manufacturer of the pharmaceutical products 
can successfully engage in third-degree price discrimination than when parallel 
trade forces prices towards uniformity.52  
 
We agree with the thesis that cross-national price discrimination without parallel 
trade is desirable from a developing countries’ perspective. Our model suggests 
that the equilibrium price in country B under parallel trade freedom – with 
country B being the country with a higher price elasticity of demand – typically 
exceeds the equilibrium price in country B under a regime of national exhaustion 
of IPRs and price discrimination without parallel trade.53 Furthermore, the 
equilibrium quantity in country B under parallel trade freedom and uniform 
pricing is typically lower than the equilibrium quantity in country B under a 
regime of national exhaustion of IPRs and price discrimination without parallel 
trade. Put differently, a lower quantity of the pharmaceutical product is sold in 
country B at a higher price under parallel trade freedom as compared to a 
situation without parallel trade. Consequently, parallel trade freedom is ceteris 
paribus detrimental to consumers in country B. 
                                                 
51 For instance, see Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong (2005: 209), Scherer and Watal (2002a: 41), Scherer and 
Watal (2002b: 925), Maskus (2001: 41), Maskus (2000b: 1276), and Maskus and Ganslandt (2002: 77). 
See also World Health Organization and World Trade Organization (2002: 210, 218), Kremer (2002: 76) 
and Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002: 41). See also Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988), 
Batson (1998: 489), Danzon and Towes (2003: 184), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), and Fink (2005: 177). 
52 For instance, see Scherer and Watal (2002a: 43). See also Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong (2005: 215) and 
Garrison (2006: 16). 
53 See also Scherer and Watal (2002a: 43) for an example of niche-pricing of pharmaceutical products in 
South Africa. More specifically, Scherer and Watal (2002a) suggest that multinational pharmaceutical 
companies charge a small but very rich minority of the South African population with high drug prices 
although the unambiguous fact that South Africa is a low-income country would suggest that drug prices are 
low. 
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Maskus and Ganslandt (2002) suggest in a non-technical article on parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals and its implications for low-income countries that, under 
plausible circumstances, parallel trade may increase prices in low-income countries 
and that smaller markets might end up not being served. 
 
Indeed, the analysis of our parallel trade model shows that this assertion is correct 
if the market in country A is sufficiently attractive as compared to the market in 
country B, i.e.    is relatively high. More specifically, we find that competition 
from parallel trade is so fierce in this case that the manufacturer has to charge 
such a high price in country B in order to deter parallel trade that the distribution 
of the pharmaceutical product in country B becomes unprofitable. In this case, the 
market in country B will not be served. Consequently, it would be desirable for 
country B to discourage parallel trade and to encourage price discrimination in 
order to open the otherwise unserved domestic market.54  
 
As an idea for further research, we propose to incorporate national price 
regulation of pharmaceutical products in order to analyze both the impact of price 
caps on the occurrence of parallel trade in equilibrium as well as the strategic 
behaviour of foreign governments to protect consumers in their countries from 
excessive (monopolistic) pricing. 
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